Files
Bubberstation/code/modules/admin/holder2.dm
Mothblocks 0f435d5dff Remove hideous inline tab indentation, and bans it in contributing guidelines (#56912)
Done using this command sed -Ei 's/(\s*\S+)\s*\t+/\1 /g' code/**/*.dm

We have countless examples in the codebase with this style gone wrong, and defines and such being on hideously different levels of indentation. Fixing this to keep the alignment involves tainting the blames of code your PR doesn't need to be touching at all. And ultimately, it's hideous.

There are some files that this sed makes uglier. I can fix these when they are pointed out, but I believe this is ultimately for the greater good of readability. I'm more concerned with if any strings relied on this.

Hi codeowners!

Co-authored-by: Jared-Fogle <35135081+Jared-Fogle@users.noreply.github.com>
2021-02-14 16:53:29 -08:00

213 lines
6.7 KiB
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GLOBAL_LIST_EMPTY(admin_datums)
GLOBAL_PROTECT(admin_datums)
GLOBAL_LIST_EMPTY(protected_admins)
GLOBAL_PROTECT(protected_admins)
GLOBAL_VAR_INIT(href_token, GenerateToken())
GLOBAL_PROTECT(href_token)
/datum/admins
var/datum/admin_rank/rank
var/target
var/name = "nobody's admin datum (no rank)" //Makes for better runtimes
var/client/owner = null
var/fakekey = null
var/datum/marked_datum
var/spamcooldown = 0
var/admincaster_screen = 0 //TODO: remove all these 5 variables, they are completly unacceptable
var/datum/newscaster/feed_message/admincaster_feed_message = new /datum/newscaster/feed_message
var/datum/newscaster/wanted_message/admincaster_wanted_message = new /datum/newscaster/wanted_message
var/datum/newscaster/feed_channel/admincaster_feed_channel = new /datum/newscaster/feed_channel
var/admin_signature
var/href_token
var/deadmined
var/datum/filter_editor/filteriffic
/datum/admins/New(datum/admin_rank/R, ckey, force_active = FALSE, protected)
if(IsAdminAdvancedProcCall())
var/msg = " has tried to elevate permissions!"
message_admins("[key_name_admin(usr)][msg]")
log_admin("[key_name(usr)][msg]")
if (!target) //only del if this is a true creation (and not just a New() proc call), other wise trialmins/coders could abuse this to deadmin other admins
QDEL_IN(src, 0)
CRASH("Admin proc call creation of admin datum")
return
if(!ckey)
QDEL_IN(src, 0)
CRASH("Admin datum created without a ckey")
if(!istype(R))
QDEL_IN(src, 0)
CRASH("Admin datum created without a rank")
target = ckey
name = "[ckey]'s admin datum ([R])"
rank = R
admin_signature = "Nanotrasen Officer #[rand(0,9)][rand(0,9)][rand(0,9)]"
href_token = GenerateToken()
if(R.rights & R_DEBUG) //grant profile access
world.SetConfig("APP/admin", ckey, "role=admin")
//only admins with +ADMIN start admined
if(protected)
GLOB.protected_admins[target] = src
if (force_active || (R.rights & R_AUTOADMIN))
activate()
else
deactivate()
/datum/admins/Destroy()
if(IsAdminAdvancedProcCall())
var/msg = " has tried to elevate permissions!"
message_admins("[key_name_admin(usr)][msg]")
log_admin("[key_name(usr)][msg]")
return QDEL_HINT_LETMELIVE
. = ..()
/datum/admins/proc/activate()
if(IsAdminAdvancedProcCall())
var/msg = " has tried to elevate permissions!"
message_admins("[key_name_admin(usr)][msg]")
log_admin("[key_name(usr)][msg]")
return
GLOB.deadmins -= target
GLOB.admin_datums[target] = src
deadmined = FALSE
if (GLOB.directory[target])
associate(GLOB.directory[target]) //find the client for a ckey if they are connected and associate them with us
/datum/admins/proc/deactivate()
if(IsAdminAdvancedProcCall())
var/msg = " has tried to elevate permissions!"
message_admins("[key_name_admin(usr)][msg]")
log_admin("[key_name(usr)][msg]")
return
GLOB.deadmins[target] = src
GLOB.admin_datums -= target
deadmined = TRUE
var/client/C
if ((C = owner) || (C = GLOB.directory[target]))
disassociate()
add_verb(C, /client/proc/readmin)
/datum/admins/proc/associate(client/C)
if(IsAdminAdvancedProcCall())
var/msg = " has tried to elevate permissions!"
message_admins("[key_name_admin(usr)][msg]")
log_admin("[key_name(usr)][msg]")
return
if(istype(C))
if(C.ckey != target)
var/msg = " has attempted to associate with [target]'s admin datum"
message_admins("[key_name_admin(C)][msg]")
log_admin("[key_name(C)][msg]")
return
if (deadmined)
activate()
owner = C
owner.holder = src
owner.add_admin_verbs() //TODO <--- todo what? the proc clearly exists and works since its the backbone to our entire admin system
remove_verb(owner, /client/proc/readmin)
owner.init_verbs() //re-initialize the verb list
GLOB.admins |= C
/datum/admins/proc/disassociate()
if(IsAdminAdvancedProcCall())
var/msg = " has tried to elevate permissions!"
message_admins("[key_name_admin(usr)][msg]")
log_admin("[key_name(usr)][msg]")
return
if(owner)
GLOB.admins -= owner
owner.remove_admin_verbs()
owner.init_verbs()
owner.holder = null
owner = null
/datum/admins/proc/check_for_rights(rights_required)
if(rights_required && !(rights_required & rank.rights))
return FALSE
return TRUE
/datum/admins/proc/check_if_greater_rights_than_holder(datum/admins/other)
if(!other)
return TRUE //they have no rights
if(rank.rights == R_EVERYTHING)
return TRUE //we have all the rights
if(src == other)
return TRUE //you always have more rights than yourself
if(rank.rights != other.rank.rights)
if( (rank.rights & other.rank.rights) == other.rank.rights )
return TRUE //we have all the rights they have and more
return FALSE
/datum/admins/vv_edit_var(var_name, var_value)
return FALSE //nice try trialmin
/*
checks if usr is an admin with at least ONE of the flags in rights_required. (Note, they don't need all the flags)
if rights_required == 0, then it simply checks if they are an admin.
if it doesn't return 1 and show_msg=1 it will prints a message explaining why the check has failed
generally it would be used like so:
/proc/admin_proc()
if(!check_rights(R_ADMIN))
return
to_chat(world, "you have enough rights!", confidential = TRUE)
NOTE: it checks usr! not src! So if you're checking somebody's rank in a proc which they did not call
you will have to do something like if(client.rights & R_ADMIN) yourself.
*/
/proc/check_rights(rights_required, show_msg=1)
if(usr?.client)
if (check_rights_for(usr.client, rights_required))
return TRUE
else
if(show_msg)
to_chat(usr, "<font color='red'>Error: You do not have sufficient rights to do that. You require one of the following flags:[rights2text(rights_required," ")].</font>", confidential = TRUE)
return FALSE
//probably a bit iffy - will hopefully figure out a better solution
/proc/check_if_greater_rights_than(client/other)
if(usr?.client)
if(usr.client.holder)
if(!other || !other.holder)
return TRUE
return usr.client.holder.check_if_greater_rights_than_holder(other.holder)
return FALSE
//This proc checks whether subject has at least ONE of the rights specified in rights_required.
/proc/check_rights_for(client/subject, rights_required)
if(subject?.holder)
return subject.holder.check_for_rights(rights_required)
return FALSE
/proc/GenerateToken()
. = ""
for(var/I in 1 to 32)
. += "[rand(10)]"
/proc/RawHrefToken(forceGlobal = FALSE)
var/tok = GLOB.href_token
if(!forceGlobal && usr)
var/client/C = usr.client
if(!C)
CRASH("No client for HrefToken()!")
var/datum/admins/holder = C.holder
if(holder)
tok = holder.href_token
return tok
/proc/HrefToken(forceGlobal = FALSE)
return "admin_token=[RawHrefToken(forceGlobal)]"
/proc/HrefTokenFormField(forceGlobal = FALSE)
return "<input type='hidden' name='admin_token' value='[RawHrefToken(forceGlobal)]'>"