Merge pull request #5365 from Citadel-Station-13/upstream-merge-35399
[MIRROR] [s]Closes exploits in proc calling admin datum procs.
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@@ -27,6 +27,14 @@ GLOBAL_PROTECT(href_token)
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var/deadmined
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/datum/admins/New(datum/admin_rank/R, ckey, force_active = FALSE)
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if(IsAdminAdvancedProcCall())
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var/msg = " has tried to elevate permissions!"
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message_admins("[key_name_admin(usr)][msg]")
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log_admin("[key_name(usr)][msg]")
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if (!target) //only del if this is a true creation (and not just a New() proc call), other wise trialmins/coders could abuse this to deadmin other admins
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QDEL_IN(src, 0)
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CRASH("Admin proc call creation of admin datum")
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return
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if(!ckey)
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QDEL_IN(src, 0)
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throw EXCEPTION("Admin datum created without a ckey")
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@@ -48,8 +56,20 @@ GLOBAL_PROTECT(href_token)
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else
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deactivate()
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/datum/admins/Destroy()
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if(IsAdminAdvancedProcCall())
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var/msg = " has tried to elevate permissions!"
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message_admins("[key_name_admin(usr)][msg]")
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log_admin("[key_name(usr)][msg]")
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return QDEL_HINT_LETMELIVE
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. = ..()
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/datum/admins/proc/activate()
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if(IsAdminAdvancedProcCall())
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var/msg = " has tried to elevate permissions!"
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message_admins("[key_name_admin(usr)][msg]")
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log_admin("[key_name(usr)][msg]")
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return
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GLOB.deadmins -= target
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GLOB.admin_datums[target] = src
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deadmined = FALSE
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@@ -58,6 +78,11 @@ GLOBAL_PROTECT(href_token)
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/datum/admins/proc/deactivate()
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if(IsAdminAdvancedProcCall())
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var/msg = " has tried to elevate permissions!"
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message_admins("[key_name_admin(usr)][msg]")
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log_admin("[key_name(usr)][msg]")
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return
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GLOB.deadmins[target] = src
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GLOB.admin_datums -= target
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deadmined = TRUE
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@@ -70,14 +95,14 @@ GLOBAL_PROTECT(href_token)
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if(IsAdminAdvancedProcCall())
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var/msg = " has tried to elevate permissions!"
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message_admins("[key_name_admin(usr)][msg]")
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log_admin_private("[key_name(usr)][msg]")
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log_admin("[key_name(usr)][msg]")
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return
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if(istype(C))
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if(C.ckey != target)
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var/msg = " has attempted to associate with [target]'s admin datum"
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message_admins("[key_name_admin(C)][msg]")
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log_admin_private("[key_name(C)][msg]")
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log_admin("[key_name(C)][msg]")
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return
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if (deadmined)
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activate()
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@@ -88,6 +113,11 @@ GLOBAL_PROTECT(href_token)
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GLOB.admins |= C
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/datum/admins/proc/disassociate()
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if(IsAdminAdvancedProcCall())
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var/msg = " has tried to elevate permissions!"
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message_admins("[key_name_admin(usr)][msg]")
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log_admin("[key_name(usr)][msg]")
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return
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if(owner)
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GLOB.admins -= owner
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owner.remove_admin_verbs()
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@@ -173,4 +203,4 @@ you will have to do something like if(client.rights & R_ADMIN) yourself.
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return "admin_token=[RawHrefToken(forceGlobal)]"
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/proc/HrefTokenFormField(forceGlobal = FALSE)
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return "<input type='hidden' name='admin_token' value='[RawHrefToken(forceGlobal)]'>"
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return "<input type='hidden' name='admin_token' value='[RawHrefToken(forceGlobal)]'>"
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